

Threat Hunting with Yara

written by Mert SARICA | 1 September 2017


Throughout the world, the trend of encrypting data on end-user systems with malicious software (such as Cryptolocker) and then attempting to profit by selling the decryption key to users continues unabated. Occasionally, security researchers are able to decrypt the data that has been encrypted by malware due to flaws in the encryption algorithms being used. However, in most cases, users are often forced to pay the high ransom demanded by malicious individuals in order to regain access to their files. With each incident, the value of data backups becomes more evident. However, as long as there are users who act on impulse rather than heeding advice, it seems unlikely that malicious actors will easily give up on this lucrative avenue in the near future.

Indeed, with the rapid increase in cyber attacks, the ability to detect threats and respond to them promptly has become of great importance for organizations. In fact, visionary companies have started embracing the practice of cyber threat hunting, aiming to identify threats that can bypass existing security technologies within their networks and systems. When looking at the technologies that enable threat hunting, you will often find that many of them support Yara, a tool that allows you to write your own signatures. Yara provides the capability to create custom rules and signatures that can be used to search for specific patterns or indicators of compromise, enhancing the detection capabilities of organizations in the ever-evolving threat landscape.

When you look at the blog post published by Halil ÖZTÜRKÇİ in 2014 regarding Yara, you can see that Yara was predominantly used in digital forensics and memory analysis, particularly with the Volatility tool. However, today you can see that Yara is widely used in various fields, ranging from threat hunting to malware analysis, from commercial products like FireEye NX to open-source and free tools like x64dbg, and even in technologies such as full packet capture. This allows security professionals to define their own rules and signatures that can be used in security systems and devices with Yara support, independent of security vendors. While the idea of writing signatures may not be pleasant for security experts who have had challenging experiences with different security technologies in the past, the situation changes when it comes to Yara because writing rules with Yara is quite

simple, yet it provides significant added value, as confirmed by experience.

During the recent resurgence of the Cryptolocker outbreak, I noticed on social media platforms and the NetSec email list that some security systems and technologies were inadequate in detecting and preventing such outbreaks. In light of this situation, I wanted to draw attention to how defensive security experts can use a simple signature written with Yara to detect similar threats with modified content when faced with such a situation.



When we look at the Cryptolocker outbreak, we observe that numerous variants of Cryptolocker were being sent from different email addresses under the name


“priceX.zip” within a span of 24 hours. Each zip file contained a downloader with obfuscated JavaScript code, which, when executed, would download and run the encryption malware on the system.

Doruk Tekin rammer@tele2.at

Ekte gönderilen mallar için birim fiyat ve teslim süresi rica ederim.

<https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/be9kvoym3hwjk69/fiyat3.zip>


İyi günler.



When it comes to detecting variants that differ in size, dimensions, and content, you can easily achieve this using Yara. First, when we list the sizes, we see that all variants except one are smaller than 55 KB. When examining the content of the files, although the content is completely

The image displays a Windows desktop environment with three Notepad++ windows and a File Explorer window. The top-left Notepad++ window shows a JavaScript file with many string literals. The top-right Notepad++ window shows a JavaScript file with function definitions. The bottom-left Notepad++ window shows a JavaScript file with many string literals. The bottom-right File Explorer window shows the contents of the C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\fiyatlar directory, listing files like fiyat1.js, fiyat2.js, fiyat3.js, fiyat4.js, fiyat7.js, fiyat9.js, fiyat10.js, grep.exe, and wc.exe.

String function in a file smaller than 55 KB would be less than 150 unless the file is suspicious, we can create a Yara signature using Yara keywords as follows. After confirming the correct functioning of our signature “cryptolocker.yar” and verifying that it can detect all the variants using the Yara tool, we can upload our signature to all security systems and technologies that support Yara. By doing so, we make significant progress in detecting new outbreaks and threats.



```
1 rule Cryptolocker
2 {
3   meta:
4     author = "Mert SARICA"
5     description = "Cryptolocker Detection (February 2017 outbreak)"
6     date = "2017/02/23"
7     reference = "https://www.mertsarica.com"
8     sample = "d01b54405d363850f8a45cfd97693d2"
9     sample = "291089237a4fb760d386dc89c701c09c"
10    sample = "7fd6a6e66f5a99840947e752da8037f8"
11    sample = "cf9f6eaf1cfb4c601fc868a8d893a72a"
12    sample = "dd9849cbdec598a39cc7b82d1c4e28bc"
13    sample = "21bc751f05b78df9e0dd238595403c3c"
14    sample = "5b58e10f894602449424fc7de6a1e794"
15  version = "1.0"
16  strings:
17    $f1 = "String" nocase wide ascii
18  condition:
19    #f1 > 150 and filesize < 55KB
20 }
```

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\fiyatlar>yara32.exe -r cryptolocker.yar .
Cryptolocker .\fiyat1.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat10.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat2.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat3.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat4.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat7.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat9.js
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\fiyatlar>
```

The image shows a Notepad++ window with a YARA rule named 'Cryptolocker'. The rule includes metadata such as author ('Mert SARICA'), description ('Cryptolocker Detection (February 2017 outbreak)'), date ('2017/02/23'), and a reference to 'https://www.mertsarica.com'. It lists several sample hashes and sets the version to '1.0'. The rule's condition checks for strings in a specific format and file size constraints.

```
1 rule Cryptolocker
2 {
3   meta:
4     author = "Mert SARICA"
5     description = "Cryptolocker Detection (February 2017 outbreak)"
6     date = "2017/02/23"
7     reference = "https://www.mertsarica.com"
8     sample = "d01b54405d363850f8a45cfd97693d2"
9     sample = "291089237a4fb760d386dc89c701c09c"
10    sample = "7fd6a6e66f5a99840947e752da8037f8"
11    sample = "cf9f6eaf1cfb4c601fc868a8d893a72a"
12    sample = "dd9849cbdec598a39cc7b82d1c4e28bc"
13    sample = "21bc751f05b78df9e0dd238595403c3c"
14    sample = "5b58e10f894602449424fc7de6a1e794"
15  version = "1.0"
16  strings:
17    $f1 = "String" nocase wide ascii
18  condition:
19    #f1 > 150 and filesize < 55KB
20 }
```

Overlaid on the Notepad++ window is a Windows command prompt window. It shows the execution of 'yara32.exe' with the rule file 'cryptolocker.yar' and a list of JavaScript files for scanning. The output shows that the rule detected 'Cryptolocker' in several files.

```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\fiyatlar>yara32.exe -r cryptolocker.yar .
Cryptolocker .\fiyat1.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat10.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat2.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat3.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat4.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat7.js
Cryptolocker .\fiyat9.js
C:\Users\Mert\Desktop\fiyatlar>
```

Hope to see you in the following articles.